








Beyond case-studies: history as philosophy
Hasok Chang

Text of presentation at the first Integrated History and Philosophy of Science conference, at the University of Pittsburgh, 13 October 2007 (text in square brackets were skipped in the presentation in the interest of time)

1. The trouble with case-studies, and the active philosophical function of history
What can we conclude from a mere handful of case-studies?  This has been a vexing question for integrated history and philosophy of science.  The field of HPS has witnessed too many hasty philosophical generalizations based on a small number of conveniently chosen case-studies.  That methodological shoddiness has contributed decisively to a widespread disillusionment with the whole HPS enterprise.  

Emblematic of this disillusionment is Kuhn, who argued that history of science and philosophy of science had different goals, and therefore "no one can practice them both at the same time" (1977a, 5).  Although he did agree that philosophy of science should ultimately be informed by some knowledge of scientific practice (historical or contemporary), Kuhn never specified a clear method for this interaction.  But without such a method, we are condemned to either unwarranted generalizations from historical cases, or entirely "local" histories with no bearing on an overall understanding of the scientific process.

In transcending that dilemma, the first thing we need to do is get away from an inductive view of the history–philosophy relation, which sees history as particular and philosophy as general.  It is much more instructive to see the history–philosophy relation as one between the concrete and the abstract.  Abstract ideas are needed for the understanding of even just one concrete episode.  We cannot understand scientists' actions, not to mention judge them, without considering them in abstract terms (such as "confirmed", "coherent", "observation", "measurement", "explanation", "simple", "novel", "self-interested", "curiosity-driven", "collective", "honest", "open-minded", etc., etc.).  Any concrete account requires abstract notions in the characterization of the relevant events, characters, circumstances and decisions.  If we extract abstract insights from our account of a concrete episode, that is not so much a process of generalization, as an articulation of what was already put into it.​[1]​ To highlight this change of perspective, I prefer to speak of historical "episodes" rather than "cases".  [When we have an episode of The Simpsons, or Buffy the Vampire Slayer, or what have you, the episode is not a case or an example of whatever the general idea of the show.  Rather, the episode is a concrete instantiation of the general concepts (the characters, the setting, the type of events to be expected, etc.), and each episode also contributes to the articulation of the general concepts.  To be sure, this analogy is very imperfect, but it does express something relevant about the relation between concrete historical episodes and abstract philosophical conceptions.]

Philosophers will be pleased but not surprised to hear that abstract conceptions are necessary for historiography.  The more novel idea I would like to propose today concerns the opposite direction of dependency — doing history can help our philosophizing, even as we refrain from crude inductions.  When there are no ready-made philosophical concepts through which a given historical episode can be properly understood, the historian needs to craft new abstract philosophical concepts (as advocated by Anouk Barberousse in her presentation); this necessity should not be resisted or avoided, but actively embraced as a great intellectual opportunity.  Instead of sitting back and complaining that existing philosophical frameworks are inadequate for understanding real history, historians can actively engage in the creation of new philosophical ideas through their concrete investigations.  History-writing can be a very effective method of philosophical discovery.

Once an abstract idea has been generated, it needs to show its worth in two different ways.  First, its cogency needs to be demonstrated through further abstract considerations and arguments.  Second, its applicability has to be tested through the framing of various other concrete episodes.  An abstraction becomes general only when it has been applied widely.  [Applicability is the mirror-image of confirmation, but it has a very different meaning and significance.]

I will illustrate these claims through two investigations in HPS from my own recent and current work.  This also raises a question of reflexivity: how can we use case-studies to show how to go beyond case-studies?!  I think you will be able to see how I answer that question, as I go on.

2. Temperature measurement and epistemic iteration
The first episode comes from my work on the history and philosophy of temperature measurement (Chang 2004).  When I started this project, I was thinking about the theory-ladenness of observation.  Having got tired of trying to explain quantum mechanics to people who didn’t really want to know, I wanted to look at something simpler.  I thought, temperature would be nice, since it is a fundamental physical concept that everyone has some sense of.  At least everyone knows how to use a basic thermometer.

Does something as simple as an ordinary mercury thermometer rely on theory?  Yes ​​— the key assumption is that mercury expands uniformly (or, linearly) with increasing temperature.  Think about how simple thermometers are made.  We take a glass tube partly filled with mercury.  We put it into freezing water, see how far the mercury comes up, and mark that point 0; we put it into boiling water, and mark the position of the mercury column 100; then we divide up the interval evenly to make a scale, calling the halfway point between zero and hundred "50", and so on.  So what we assume is that when the temperature is exactly 50° centigrade, the mercury comes up exactly to the halfway point.  But is that true?  Let me show you some simple data from the mid-19th century, which illustrates why practicing scientists would have worried about this philosophical-sounding problem.  What this table shows is that if you fill thermometers with different liquids, they will differ very seriously in the middle of the scale, even if you fix them to agree at the fixed points.  How can we tell which one is correct?
	
If you are a good physicist, you would think that assumptions about the behavior of thermometric fluids should of course be tested by experiment.  So you would want to take some data, and make a plot of the volume (height) of mercury against temperature, and see if the points lie on a straight line.  But how would you get the temperature values, unless you already had a thermometer you can trust, which is exactly what you don’t have yet?  You could try using a different kind of thermometer to take the temperature values, but then you have to ask how you know that thermometer is correct.  Alternatively, you could try to make a theoretical argument about whether mercury expands linearly or not, but that would require a detailed theory of thermal physics, which you would, in all likelihood, have to test by experiments that involve the measurement of temperature.    

So either way, we seem to be stuck with a circularity, and I was about to give up.  Then it occurred to me: "But they have done it!" — meaning, scientists today do know exactly how mercury expands with temperature (and they tell us that the expansion is far from linear).  So someone must have figured out how to solve the problem, and the least I could do was to go and look at the actual history to learn how it was done.  

When I did look at the history, however, what I found was quite puzzling.  I couldn’t find any satisfactory foundationalist answers, which is what I was after.  Some scientists did propose foundationalist solutions, but they were all duly shot down by other scientists.  Now, with my limited philosophical imagination, I thought that if foundationalism did not work, then the fallback position was coherentism.  Quine's web of belief and Neurath's boat beckoned, as I drowned in the historical mess.  But I also found that the primary literature I was looking at clearly conveyed a sense of progress in thermometry, which could not easily be captured in straightforward coherentism.  [I had great difficulty in making sense of this historical episode, as long as my understanding was limited by the philosophical framework defined by the opposition between foundationalism and coherentism.]

What got me out of that impasse was the idea of "epistemic iteration" (which was kindly mentioned by Jutta Schickore in her presentation, and has great affinity to Chris Shmeenk’s joint paper with George Smith, as well as some other work by the latter).  The concept of iteration allowed me to see that the circularity in question was more like a helix, in which scientists began by presuming the validity of an untested measurement method, starting a process of inquiry which eventually doubled back on itself to refine and correct its own starting assumptions.  Epistemic iteration is a process in which we create successive stages of knowledge, each building on the preceding one, in order to enhance the achievement of certain epistemic goals, such as precision, consistency, scope, explanatory power, simplicity, and so on.  We do not start with indubitable facts, or unrevisable axioms.  Instead, we start with a system of knowledge that we recognize as imperfect or even faulty, which is used for its own improvement.  No fixed algorithm tells us how to proceed (this is in the spirit of John Norton’s “material theory”).  But we have the impetus and constraints provided by the epistemic values and aims that we adopt.

Inventing the concept of epistemic iteration helped capture the historical development of thermometry more sensibly.  First, people started with sensation, assuming that the feeling of hot and cold corresponded to high and low temperatures.  Then they created "thermoscopes", by finding certain materials that seemed to expand and contract regularly as things felt hotter and colder.  Thermoscopes extended the observable temperature range, and they were also more sensitive than human sensation.  When thermoscopes were well enough established, they also began to correct sensations, as people ceded epistemic authority about temperature to these simple machines: so you might say "I feel colder but the mercury is not moving — I must be getting a fever."  And so on.  This kind of refinement and self-correction happened again when people made numerical thermometers starting from thermoscopes, by attaching scales to them.  

The making of numerical thermometers led to further iterative improvements.  Although there never was any indubitable reason for believing that any particular thermometric substance expanded uniformly, various numerical thermometers were made, each on the presumption of uniformity, and eventually those that did not return self-consistent numbers were rejected; Victor Regnault’s work in the 1840s was crucial in that development.  The most self-consistent thermometric fluid turned out to be air, and the readings of air-thermometers provided the basis for William Thomson's thermodynamic theory and the Joule-Thomson experiment, with which the physicists corrected the air-thermometer used for that very experiment.  In this whole process there was progress without a firm 

foundation, in terms of increasing precision, consistency, and scope of the measurements.​[2]​

So, that was the origin of my ideas about epistemic iteration, born out of historiographical necessity.  The next step was to test, develop and apply these ideas more broadly.  As I don't have the time to go through the details of the doctrine of "progressive coherentism" that I developed, I will just show you a metaphorical picture of it.  I mentioned my disillusionment with foundationalism.  The traditional foundationalist picture of building knowledge on a firm ground does not work, since there is no such thing in empirical science corresponding to that firm ground.  But foundationalists have actually been sitting on the perfect metaphor for the kind of ideas I want to express — we only have to remember that the earth is not flat.  In real construction, we don't build upward on a flat earth, but outward on a round earth; that is how the metaphor has to work, too.  There are no fixed points and no up-and-down in the universe.  We build on the earth not because it is firmly fixed anywhere, but because it is a large and dense body that attracts other things, and we happen to live on it.  I have found this framework of progressive coherentism quite useful in thinking about other historical episodes, so at least to my own mind it has proven its broad applicability.

3. The Chemical Revolution: constitution, weights, and practices
The second episode, about the Chemical Revolution, comes from current research that will be incorporated into my next book, titled Is Water H2O?

3.1. The puzzle of the Chemical Revolution (example of water)
This time I will go straight to the historical puzzle, without the whole story of how I came to it.  Here it is: why did the majority of chemists go over to Lavoisier's new chemistry, when it seems that the phlogiston theory could account for observed phenomena just as well?  As a quick reminder, I will give you just one very simple illustration of the equal empirical adequacy of the two theories:​[3]​









Isn’t this enough to refute the phlogiston theory, which held that water was an element?  Not so, as there is a coherent alternative interpretation based on phlogistonist ideas:

Dephlogisticated water + Phlogisticated water  Water  (Cavendish/Priestley)

And there are many other similar instances of empirical equivalence between the two theories.  But if there was this kind of equivalence in empirical adequacy, how can we explain the mass-conversion to Lavoisier?  We could say it was the result of scientific rhetoric, politics or fashion, but I think those factors give only a partial explanation.  (In this day and age, I think we might have to say: when external explanations are insufficient, we must invoke internal ones. So that is what I am going to do.)
3.2. The failure of standard philosophical solutions
I think the best integrated HPS work we have on this subject is still Alan Musgrave's paper of 1976.  Musgrave starts by rejecting some old misconceptions (1976, 182–186).  He shows that Lavoisier's new chemistry was not completely established by induction, and the phlogiston theory was not simply falsified by facts.  Also problematic is the notion that Lavoisier's theory was inherently simpler than the phlogiston theory.  A crude version of this idea says that the phlogiston theory unnecessarily complicated things by postulating the existence of an unobservable and redundant substance, namely phlogiston; this argument ignores the fact that Lavoisier also had to postulate just such a substance, caloric, which he proudly put at the head of his table of simple substances.​[4]​  

And I don't believe Musgrave's own story works, either.  His Lakatosian answer proposes that the crucial factor was the comparative progressiveness of the two competing research programmes.  [It was rational for chemists to abandon the phlogiston programme because it stopped making successful new predictions and only resorted to ad hoc hypotheses.  Musgrave maintains (1976, 205): "Between 1770 and 1785 the oxygen programme…developed coherently and each new version was theoretically and empirically progressive, whereas after 1770 the phlogiston programme did neither."]  But Musgrave himself states (1976, 199): "While Lavoisier was failing, Priestley was having great success with the 1766 version of phlogistonism. . . . the most impressive experiment of all came in early 1783."  This was the confirmation of the phlogistonist prediction that a calx would be reduced to metal by heating in inflammable air.  To support the Lakatosian argument, then, we need to find successful novel predictions that Lavoisier made around 1783 or later.  Where are these predictions?  Musgrave doesn't tell us.  Was he thinking of the prediction that the oxidation of inflammable air (hydrogen) would produce an acid?​[5]​  Or the prediction that muriatic (hydrochloric) acid would be decomposed into oxygen and the "muriatic radical", which even appears in his list of elements?
3.3. Divergent values and divergent manifestations of values; pluralistic implications
Faced with these philosophical failures, I started looking for a different framework for understanding the Chemical Revolution.  The most promising one was theory-choice on the basis of epistemic values, as articulated in Kuhn's paper "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice" (1977b).  My preliminary conclusion in those terms is that the opposing camps of chemists did uphold different epistemic values.  For example, Priestley had an ideal of completeness in recording and explaining every damned thing happening in his lab (which he achieved by twisting his theory if necessary), while Lavoisier pursued clean and elegant theoretical uniformity.  There was a clear trade-off between these two values, as Kuhn said we should often expect.  So it makes sense that many people followed Lavoisier in pursuing uniformity, but some remained with Priestley in maintaining a stronger respect for all the messiness and particularity of phenomena.  This analysis seemed to dictate a pluralistic outlook for the philosopher, since I found no compelling objective argument that uniformity was more important (or truth-conducive) than completeness.  And so on.
3.4. Weight: puzzle for the pluralist 
Scientific pluralism is something I am in the process of studying and developing.  However, there is one major issue to be dealt with before I can close the study of the Chemical Revolution on a pluralistic note.  This is the matter of weight.  It is a commonplace that Lavoisier's most important contributions to chemistry included his emphasis on weights.  [And indeed, weight considerations seem to have been quite persuasive, because they resolved the disputes about the constitution of key substances in Lavoisier's favor.]

One can have a stark view about the Chemical Revolution, if one focuses on weights.  Take water again.  Lavoisier's view is crystal-clear: take 100 g[rains] of water, and we make 15g of hydrogen and 85g of oxygen out of it;​[6]​ and then, put those precise amounts of hydrogen and oxygen together, and make 100g of water again. (Set aside, for the moment, the fact that these numbers given by Lavoisier are quite wrong, despite the high precision he claimed.)  What better proof could there be of the compound nature of water?  Compare this beautiful account with the phlogistonist story, one might continue: when Cavendish and Priestley said that hydrogen was "phlogisticated water" and oxygen was "dephlogisticated water", they gave no convincing story about why phlogistication should make water less dense than dephlogistication does.  Nor was there a definite account of how much of the water should go into the inflammable air and how much into the dephlogisticated air.
	
We must, however, resist the temptation to be over-hasty in our judgment.​[7]​  There never was any absolute reason why weight must be conserved (and indeed, E=mc2 proclaims that it is not).  So, the conservation of weight was not a timeless fact that decided the outcome of the Chemical Revolution.  But an obsession with weight is not exactly an epistemic value, either.  So here we have another puzzle: what is the proper epistemological way to conceptualize Lavoisier's emphasis on weight?  Do we say that it was simply a part of the Lavoisierian paradigm?  I think that is too vague.  And in order for the Kuhnian idea to work, we would need to specify the criteria of success that qualified Lavoisier's early work as a paradigm, which I find difficult to do without being entirely circular.  So, once again, I am searching for a new idea.
3.5. Compositionism vs. principlism
Those of us educated to any degree in modern chemistry seem to share the prejudice that weight is of course the important thing to focus on in good chemistry.  Where does that conviction come from?  I believe it is an aspect of a whole metaphysical-experimental complex of practices, which I call "compositionism".  To paraphrase Robert Siegfried and Betty Jo Dobbs (1968), the most important thing about the Chemical Revolution was not oxygen and phlogiston, but the triumph of compositionism over its antithesis, which has been called "principlism".  As John McEvoy (1978-79, 31) put it, “the debate between Priestley and the ‘anti-phlogistians’ evinces a clash between the metaphysics of ‘principles’ and the new logic of ‘elements’ endemic to the main thrust of the oxygen theory.”

Principlism held that there were principles, namely active fundamental substances that imparted certain characteristic properties to other, more passive substances.  Experiments aligned with principlist thinking treated chemistry as a business of transformations.  For example, early on, Priestley made observations on air that was "infected" with "animal respiration" or with "the fumes of burning charcoal” (Priestley 1775, Contents), and he celebrated Joseph Black's discovery that fixed air rendered calcareous substances mild (Priestley 1775, 3).  Priestley came to apply this principlist thinking to phlogiston, speaking of how air was transformed by the addition of phlogiston in a "regular gradation from dephlogisticated air, through common air, and phlogisticated air, down to nitrous air" (1772, 392; see also Priestley 1777, 20).  [This series was not an idle piece of theorizing, but something rooted in his minute laboratory operations.  In his numerous experiments leading to (and based on) these conceptions, weight was not something Priestley noted very frequently.  Such was common practice in the phlogistonist tradition.  In the early days of phlogiston chemistry, changes of weight seemed capricious in relation to phlogistication (most combustibles seemed to lose weight on phlogistication, while metals seems to gain it), which meant that weight was not a reliable variable if one wanted to extract stable patterns of nature from these phenomena.]

In contrast, compositionism was based on the idea of stable chemical substances, all of which had equal ontological status.  Chemical reactions were processes of taking substances apart and re-arranging the parts. Lavoisier's early fascination with pneumatic chemistry was with how air was absorbed and given out by solid substances.  That, combined with his quantitative bent, resulted in a focus on weight as a variable allowing the tracing of what came in and out of chemical substances.  Lavoisier adopted the practice of decomposition-and-recomposition for ascertaining the constitution of substances.  This practice required the presumption of stable components preserved through chemical reactions, and Lavoisier brought in the balance to track their movement.  A powerful, complex system of compositionist practices grew up in Lavoisierian chemistry.  But without a more detailed investigation, I cannot say that this compositionist system was clearly superior to the principlist system.
3.6. Experimental-metaphysical complex of practices
This is a story that I am still in the process of working out.  But what I can see already is that the idea of a complex of practices has some very good potential for reformulating the philosophical debates on theory-choice, and other related issues such as evidence, realism and pluralism.  I am working on a more systematic understanding of how the success and coherence of a complex of practices should and do contribute to the adoption of a theory that is linked up with it.  I am also working out more precise notions of "success" and "coherence", for which I am drawing from the tradition of pragmatist philosophy.  The practical complex could take the place of the Kuhnian paradigm, which would also allow us to refresh the concepts of incommensurability and scientific revolutions.

4. Concluding remarks
I started by problematizing the common use of historical case-studies in relation to philosophy of science.  And then I tried to illustrate one particular mode of history-philosophy interaction, which can be schematized as follows:

Existing philosophical framework
 Historiographical puzzle: difficult-to-describe episode
 Search for a new philosophical framework
 Better understanding of the episode, with new philosophical framework
 Further development of new philosophical framework
 Application of new framework to other episodes

We start with an existing philosophical framework, and find historiographical puzzles, namely episodes that are difficult to describe and understand.  In attempts to find an apposite description of these episodes, historians can generate new concepts and ways of thinking that philosophers may not come up with from their entirely abstract work.  Then philosophers can take up the new abstract ideas generated through the historical work, and develop and apply them further.  (In this business it is difficult to say whether the investigator is working as a historian or a philosopher, but that is just the point.  Unlike Kuhn, I think this process works out best if the historian and the philosopher is the same person doing both at the same time.)

There is also a mirror-image of this process, in which philosophy helps history.  This is the subject of a whole other paper, which I presented at the HPS conference at Duke in March:

Existing historiography
 Philosophical puzzle: "Lakatosian" sense of irrationality
 Search for better historiography
 Removal of philosophical puzzle
 Empirical work to complete new historical account
 Reflections on other related history

I believe that both of these processes have already been at work in much of the best work in integrated HPS, and I hope that my articulation will help them continue in more conscious, thorough and methodologically sound ways.





mode/function	history gives philosophy:	philosophy gives history:
Necessary ("HS w/o PS is blind; PS w/o HS is empty.")	Subject matter	Conceptual framework
Critical	Counter-examples	Detection of implausibility
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^1	  It may even be an act of self-analysis, in case the episode was initially narrated without a good awareness of the abstractions that guided its construction. 
^2	  Details of this episode can be found in Chang (2004), chapter 2.
^3	  Priestley maintained this view of things until his death, and it is quite telling that his last stance was a book titled The Doctrine of Phlogiston Established and That of the Composition of Water Refuted, published in 1803.  By that time, most others had converted to Lavoisier's theory.
^4	  I think more sophisticated attempts, such as Pyle (2000), suffer from the same problem.
^5	  Again, Musgrave himself points out this failed Lavoisierian prediction, and how long he had struggled with it (1976, 199–200).
^6	  I am using Lavoisier's own figures (see Kirwan 1789, 16), except that his pre-Revolutionary "g" was "grain", not the metric "gram" that he helped to put in place.
^7	  Weight was not the proper measure of the amount of all chemical substances even in Lavoisier's own chemistry, since the first two in his list of simple substances, light and caloric, did not have weight.
